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Comment on “Quantum key distribution without alternative measurements”
Yong-Sheng Zhang, Chuan-Feng Li∗, Guang-Can Guo†
Laboratory of Quantum Communication and Quantum Computation and Department
of Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026,
People’s Republic of China
In a recent paper [A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052312 (2000)], a quantum key distribution
protocol based on entanglement swapping was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown
that this protocol is insecure if Eve use a special strategy to attack.
PACS number(s): 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Bz
In a recent paper [1], Cabello presented a quantum
key distribution (QKD) protocol based on entanglement
swapping [2]. A strategy of attack by the eavesdropper
(Eve) using a pair of entangled particles was discussed,
and the protocol is shown to be secure in that case. How-
ever, here we will show that Eve can obtain the key with-
out being detected by the communication parties with a
pair of entangled particles.
For convenience, we use the same notation as in Ref.
[1]. The four Bell states are denoted by
|00〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (1)
|01〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |0〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |1〉j
)
, (2)
|10〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j + |1〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
, (3)
|11〉ij =
1√
2
(
|0〉i ⊗ |1〉j − |1〉i ⊗ |0〉j
)
, (4)
where i, j are labels of the particles.
The eavesdropping strategy is illustrated in Fig. 1 and
can be described as follows. In the beginning, Alice has
particles 1 and 2 in state |11〉
12
, and 3 and 5 in state
|10〉
35
. Bob has particles 4 and 6 in state |10〉
46
. All this
information is public. Eve prepares particles 7 and 8 in
state |10〉
78
.
Figure 1
(i) Alice sends particle 2 to Bob using a public channel
and makes a Bell type measurement on particles 1 and
3. Eve intercepts and keeps this particle and sends her
particle 7 to Bob impersonating particle 2 Alice sends
out.
(ii) Bob makes a Bell type measurement on 7 and 4,
then sends particle 6 to Alice. Eve intercepts it and
makes a Bell measurement on 6 and 8.
(iii) Eve makes a unitary transformation on particle 2
according to the measurement result of particles 6 and
8. She makes transformation I, X, Y, or Z correspond-
ing to her measurement result |10〉, |00〉, |01〉, or |11〉
respectively. I, X, Y, and Z are operators
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, (5)
Y =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (1)
Then Eve sends particle 2 to Alice impersonating the
particle 6 Bob sends out.
(iv) Alice makes a Bell type measurement on 5 and 2
and publicly announce the result. Thus Alice’s and Bob’s
results of measurement will be consistent as if there is no
eavesdropper intervening.
The reason that Eve makes a unitary operation on par-
ticle 2 is as follows. Assume that Alice’s particles 2 and
5 are in state |Φ〉, if Eve does not intervene and Bob’s re-
sult of Bell type measurement is σ |10〉 (σ is one of I, X ,
Y and Z), Alice’s result of Bell type measurement will be
σ |Φ〉. Now, Eve intervene the process, her result of the
Bell measurement on 6 and 8 will be the same as Bob’s
result of the Bell measurement on 7 and 4. For the con-
sistent of Alice’s and Bob’s measurement, if Eve obtain
the result σ |10〉, she ought to makes a transformation
σ on particle 2, so that when Alice measures particles 2
and 5, she obtains the proper result σ |Φ〉.
For example, suppose that Alice obtains “11” in her
measurement on particles 1 and 3, and Alice can know
that the state of 5 and 2 is |10〉
25
. Suppose that Bob has
obtained “00” in his measurement on 7 and 4. Eve will
obtain “00” in her measurement on 6 and 8 too, then she
makes a transformation X on particle 2 and sends it to
Alice. Alice makes a Bell measurement on 2 and 5 and
will obtain the result “00”. From Table I in [1], Alice
∗Electronic address: cfli@ustc.edu.cn
†Electronic address: gcguo@ustc.edu.cn
1
knows that Bob has obtained “00” and Bob can know
Alice’s initial result is “11”. Alice’s result “11” will be
the key bits between them. Because Eve knows Bob’s
result and Alice’s public announcement of the measure-
ment result of 2 and 5, she can know Alice’s initial result
“11” from Table I too.
All steps above will introduce no error in the key distri-
bution between Alice and Bob, and Eve can know exactly
the result of Bob’s measurement in step (ii) and also the
public information publicly announced in step (ii). So
Eve can obtain the key they distributed successfully. In
conclusion, this protocol is insecure against this type at-
tack.
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Figure caption:
Figure1. Eve’s strategy to obtain Alice’s secret re-
sult. The notations are the same as in Ref. [1]. The
bold lines connect qubits in Bell states, the dashed lines
connect qubits on which a Bell operator measurement is
made, and the pointed lines connect qubits in Bell states
induced by entanglement swapping. “00” means that the
bell state |00〉 is public knowledge, (00) means that it is
only known to Alice, [00] means that it is only known to
Bob, | 00| means that it is unknown to all the parts, {00}
means that it is only known to Eve, [(00)] means that it
is known to Alice and Bob (and Eve), etc.
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